INTRODUCTION
It is of critical importance to [Illinois] , and fundamental to our system of government, that we have a criminal justice system upon which we can rely to produce a just and fair result. Revelations of wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice inevitably undermine the confidence of the general public in the reliability of the criminal justice system as a whole. 1 American prosecutors have a duty to uphold justice. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, the public prosecutor is "the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty.., whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." 2 The prosecutor's role as a "minister of justice" 3 gives rise to the prosecutorial responsibility of assuring that the criminal justice system produces fair results. 4 To ensure just outcomes, prosecutors are tasked with distinct responsibilities, including disclosure obligations to turn over exculpatory information to the defense. 5 This obligation is rooted in the United States Constitution and is commonly referred to as the Brady rule. 6 A failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice" and thus violates due process. 7 As is the case across the United States, troubles abound in Illinois with respect to prosecutorial compliance with the Brady rule. Failures to disclose became especially visible in recent years amidst revelations pointing to the "persistent problems in the administration of the death penalty" in Illinois. 8 Illinois quickly became the center of a media concerns about the death penalty process also prompted the Illinois Supreme Court to appoint a special committee to propose new rules pertaining to capital cases. 14 Both the Commission and Committee proffered a host of suggestions, including measures for preventing Brady violations. Several of these proposals have been adopted by the Illinois legislature and courts. 15 Owing to its attempts to better protect the rights of the accused, Illinois has become the bellwether of criminal justice reform in the United States. 16 Across the country, states are contemplating ways to improve the administration of criminal justice and are looking to Illinois for guidance. Formerly the state that triggered the current national crisis of confidence in the American criminal justice system, Illinois now serves as a role model for other states seeking to avert future instances of false conviction. 17 This Article endeavors, by comparative study, to assess the potential of the Illinois reforms to actually alleviate miscarriages of justice and strengthen prosecutorial observance of the Brady imperative. Specifically, this Article examines the Illinois prosecutor's responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and evaluates the likelihood that the latest amendments to the disclosure obligation will meet with success in view of the problems encountered by the United Kingdom in implementing similar reforms. Part I provides an overview of the government's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. 18 This Part also discusses prosecutorial failure to satisfy disclosure requirements and state proposals for guaranteeing compliance with federal and state directives. 19 Part II discusses the United Kingdom's disclosure experience, from its common law origins [Vol. 38
to the current statutory regime of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 ("CPIA"). 20 This Part also describes the CPIA's detailed framework for advance disclosure of exculpatory evidence to defense solicitors. 2 1 Part III contemplates the changes to Illinois laws and ethical provisions in light of the UK disclosure experience, focusing especially on the UK experience with the CPIA. 2 2 Illinois' struggles with disclosure and efforts to reform its system track the UK's disclosure dilemmas and its attempts to resolve them. 23 Consequently, a comparison of the two systems as well as discussion of the UK experience with disclosure under the CPIA should prove instructive for state policymakers dedicated to advancing the due process protections secured by the Brady rule.
I. THE ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE EXPERIENCE
Illinois prosecutors bear evidentiary disclosure responsibilities under both the United States Constitution and state rules. Recent findings, however, show that prosecutors do not always fulfill their disclosure obligations. To address these shortcomings, the Illinois legislature and courts have sought ways to ensure that state prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.
A. The Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in Illinois

Federal Constitutional Disclosure Requirements
In Brady v. Maryland, 2 4 the United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ' 21. See infra Part II.C. 22. The CPIA changes to the common law duty of disclosure have been severely criticized and proved unworkable in practice. See infra Part 11.B (discussing how the CPIA altered the common law duty of disclosure).
23. In particular, though, the present UK structure provides for a broader range of discovery than that which exists in Illinois, the Illinois proposals for reform are markedly reminiscent of several CPIA provisions and the Illinois amendments follow a similar overall trajectory as disclosure obligations established in the CPIA. See infra Part ll.B (describing the disclosure structure followed in the UK). condemning government actions in misrepresenting or suppressing the truth in criminal cases. 26 These earlier cases established that a conviction is invalid if attained through the use of evidence known by the State to be false. 2 7 Likewise, the earlier precedent established that a State cannot allow false evidence to remain uncorrected, regardless of its innocence in soliciting the untruthful information. 2 8 This requirement of candor before the court comports with the "rudimentary demands of justice" 29 and is "implicit in any concept of ordered liberty."9 30 The purpose of the disclosure rule is to ensure fair trials, and the failure to comply with the Brady rule violates due process. 3 1 As stated by the Brady Court, "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."
32
The suppression of Brady material inflicts harm on an accused 33 and undermines public faith in prosecutorial integrity 34 and the accuracy of criminal convictions. 35 Accordingly, a conviction resulting from a failure to disclose cannot stand. 27. In Mooney, allegations that the prosecution deliberately suppressed impeachment evidence lead the Court to declare that "depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured" violates due process guarantees. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. In Pyle, the Court declared that allegations of government use of perjured testimony and deliberate suppression of favorable evidence were sufficient to charge a deprivation of due process rights. 34. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 88 (stating that failure to disclose "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice"); Agurs, 427 U.S. at Ill (stating that prosecutor "must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done' and "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer") (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) process mandate, the prosecution must divulge exculpatory evidence, including evidence that can be used to impeach a prosecution witness, 3 7 even in the absence of a request for information from the defense. 38 The disclosure rule applies regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution in falling short of its command; 39 the rule is equally applicable to negligent and willful nondisclosures. 40 What is more, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police" and thus may be charged with knowledge of exculpatory evidence known to other government entities. The Court has also set limitations on the otherwise broad duty to disclose by defining what evidence is material to guilt or punishment.
Evidence is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. 42 A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 4 3 Not every failure to disclose, however, amounts to a "true" Brady violation. 44 A "true" Brady violation transpires only when the "nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would 37. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) . The government, however, is not charged with disclosing favorable information that would be inadmissible as evidence unless a reasonable likelihood exists that the result would have been different at trial. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1995) (finding no Brady violation stemming from failure to disclose inadmissible polygraph information showing that key prosecution witness had lied). Cf Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("Inadmissible evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence.").
38. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07. In Agurs, the Court established differing standards of materiality for failures to disclose, based on whether the defense requested the withheld information and, if so, whether the request was a specific or general request. Id. at 108-12. These standards were replaced by the uniform criterion of Bagley. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (abandoning Agurs categories of "specific request," "general request," and "no request").
39. To facilitate government compliance with constitutional disclosure requirements, the State of Illinois has implemented rules to address prosecutorial obligations. In particular, the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted Rule 412(c), which provides: "[T]he State shall disclose to defense counsel any material or information within its possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce his punishment therefore."
48
The Due Process Clause already imposes this obligation, but the Illinois rule does not limit the duty to disclosing only evidence material to the guilt or punishment of the accused. 49 Rather, the rule commands the state to produce any exculpatory evidence.
Rule 412(c) also requires the prosecution to "make a good-faith effort" to identify these materials at the time of disclosure if such identification is possible. 50 To this end, the commentary following the rule provides examples of information likely to be exculpatory or mitigating, including a statement that someone other than the defendant 45 Failures to meet disclosure obligations may arise from the prosecution's deliberate decision to withhold information from the defense. 66 For example, in the infamous Ford Heights Four case, in which four men were wrongfully convicted of a 1978 murder, the prosecutors presented false and misleading scientific evidence during the trial. 67 They also allowed witnesses to lie about benefits used to induce their testimony. 6 8 Refusals to disclose, however, are not always willful. Oftentimes, prosecutors are simply unaware of or lack access to evidence that must be made available to the defense. Prosecutors typically rely on investigating agencies and other individuals to supply information regarding a case and thus may not have in their immediate possession all information that should be released to the defense. For example, exculpatory information may be in the knowledge and possession of others acting on the government's behalf, such as another prosecutor, 69 law enforcement officers, 70 or even other governmental agencies. Moreover, an investigative officer may be disinclined to release evidence favorable to the defense for fear that it will harm the prosecution's case or in the belief that it is immaterial.
2
The suppression of exculpatory or mitigating information by law enforcement officers can make the prosecution's task of disclosing Brady materials difficult.
73
Another reason for lack of compliance with disclosure imperatives may be a prosecutor's overzealous commitment to advocacy.
7 4 The desire to win a case may cause some prosecutors to concentrate their sights solely on achieving victory, at the expense of upholding justice.
75
The quest for success can affect a prosecutor's ability to objectively weigh the materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a 75. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 67, at CI ("Winning has become more important than doing justice.") (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz); Marshall Testimony, supra note 68 (discussing how some prosecutors "forget that judgment and wisdom are key job qualifications for the position-not simply the ability to obtain convictions at whim").
phenomenon referred to as "tunnel vision" or "confirmatory bias." 76 In particular, a prosecutor may "convince [herself] that a satisfactory reason justifies not providing the exculpatory evidence, such as 'the defense must have discovered it themselves,' or 'it is just an aberration and does not really undercut the prosecution's case."' 77 Finally, the consequences of a Brady violation are not particularly daunting. Even if the defense learns about the exculpatory evidence, 78 to gain a new trial, the defendant must show that the failure to disclose denied him a fair trial. 79 The standard for evaluating these claims is strict: the defendant must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable probability that disclosure of the information would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. 80 This showing is often quite difficult to make once the government has procured a conviction. 8 1 Moreover, prosecutors rarely face professional discipline for suppressing evidence, 77. Levenson, supra note 72, at 34. Levenson also remarks that "[p]rosecutors are particularly likely to lose their judgment if they enjoy a close working relationship with the officers whose misconduct will be disclosed when impeachment or exculpatory information is revealed to the defense." Id. at 35.
78. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2005) (noting the unlikelihood that exculpatory evidence will be discovered); Weeks, supra note 60, at 869 ("For every one of these cases, we have every reason to suspect that there are many more in which the prosecutor's refusal to disclose the exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the defendant or his attorney.").
79. Prior to conviction, courts will often remedy Brady violations by ordering late compliance. Levenson, supra note 72, at 34. 80. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) . In Bagley, the Court declared that "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (asserting that the defense must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
81. Levenson, supra note 72, at 35. Critics of the "reasonable probability" standard argue that it is too demanding and thus encourages prosecutors to withhold Brady evidence. See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 60, at 870; Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393, 438 (1992) (stating that, in practice, if "a conviction results, reversal will not be ordered unless an appellate judge can conclude that the trial jury probably would have acquitted the defendant had the evidence been disclosed"); Rosen, supra note 64, at 707-08 (asserting that "a prosecutor knows that a decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily result in a reversal of the conviction"). [Vol. 38 thus rendering any deterrent effect offered by the ethical rules a practical nullity.
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C. Illinois Proposals for Reform
In response to vociferous public outcry stemming from the many recently publicized cases of wrongful conviction in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases and former Governor Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment issued numerous proposals to reform the state criminal justice system. 83 Among their many recommendations, the Death Penalty Committee and the Governor's Commission provided suggestions for ensuring prosecutorial adherence to the Brady rule.
Several of these suggestions were incorporated into Illinois laws and court rules. The revisions seek to educate prosecutors about their disclosure duties and encourage them to "do justice. ' Professor Richard Rosen surveyed lawyer disciplinary bodies in all fifty states and the District of Columbia and discovered a dearth of proceedings pursued against prosecutors for Brady violations over the course of six years. Rosen, supra note 64, at 720-30 (finding only nine disciplinary proceedings). Professor Lawrence Marshall attributes the disinclination to discipline prosecutorial misconduct as tacit approval: "Many players in the system-judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors-know some of the stuff that happens, but nonetheless tend to turn a blind eye. There's a feeling that that is how it works, that it's legitimate to bend the truth sometimes when you are doing it with 'the greater good' in mind." Armstrong & Possley, supra, at NI (quoting Professor Marshall). But see Armstrong & Possley, supra note 61, at Cl (describing charges brought against Cook County law enforcement officials for conspiring to frame defendant for murder of ten-year-old girl by, inter alia, concealing exculpatory evidence). Though ultimately acquitted, the law enforcement officers called the "DuPage 7" were brought to trial. In addition to these recommendations, the Capital Punishment Commission suggested that the Illinois Supreme Court assist prosecutors in their Brady obligations by defining "exculpatory evidence." 9 1 To this end, the Commission recommended the following definition:
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited to, all information that is material and favorable to the defendant because it tends to: (1) Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential element in any count in the indictment or information; (2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to suppress or exclude; degree of the defendant's culpability or mitigate the defendant's potential sentence.
92
The Commission also recommended that the state legislature clearly describe police duties "to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry," including those that point away from an identified suspect, 9 3 and to document all evidence, including exculpatory evidence. 94 The former proposal was designed to combat tunnel vision and confirmatory bias in policing, which may lead investigating officers to focus exclusively on a particular suspect and prevent them from objectively evaluating whether other individuals are potentially guilty. 9 5 The latter proposal calls for the police to keep schedules listing all relevant evidence and to provide copies of the schedules to the prosecutor. 9 6 The Commission also suggested that a specific law enforcement employee be responsible for maintaining these records 97 and that the legislature expressly require the police to "give the prosecutor access to all investigatory materials in their possession." Feb. 18, 1992 . In the 1970s, Stefan Kiszko, a young, learningdisabled man, was charged with the rape and murder of a young girl and documentary evidence of his sterility (which rendered him incapable of producing the DNA evidence found at the scene) was known to the prosecution, but was not disclosed to the defense. Id. Consequently, Kiszko was convicted and served sixteen years in prison before the documents came to light and his conviction was quashed. Id. He died shortly after his release. Id.
[Vol. 38 many of these cases, had the United Kingdom retained capital punishment, it is almost certain that such sentences would have been imposed.
The law of disclosure in the United Kingdom initially developed through the common law. Alarm at the failings of the system, however, coupled with concern from police and prosecutors at the ever-expanding scope of the disclosure obligations, culminated in the passage of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.00 The Act imposed more stringent disclosure obligations on police and prosecutors, but also, for the first time, imposed a reciprocal duty of disclosure on the defense, thereby reinforcing the inequality of bargaining power between the state and the accused. 10 1 Unfortunately, the imposition of a statutory disclosure regime has done little to prevent further miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom.
A. The Development of Disclosure in the United Kingdom
Although the principle of disclosure is well established in the United Kingdom, 10 2 there have been concerns for many years over the application of the common law procedures. to the Defence 10 4 in 1982, police and prosecutors received more structured guidance on the precise scope of their duties in relation to disclosure. The Guidelines introduced the term "unused material" 1°5 into the vocabulary of the criminal justice system and provided that such material is subject to disclosure when "it has some bearing on the offence(s) charged and the subsequent circumstances of the case." 10 6
Despite its apparent simplicity, however, subsequent events showed just how broadly this rule of instruction could be interpreted.
10 7 Also, the fact that the Guidelines did not entirely replace the common law rules on disclosure sparked confusion over their precise legal status. Dispute as to whether they enjoyed the full force of law 10 8 or whether they were merely advisory 10 9 was finally resolved in 1995 when the Court of Appeal approved the latter interpretation.' 1 0 Nonetheless, the courts continued to progressively expand the remit of the prosecution disclosure obligation. By 1989, the scope of "unused material," as defined in R v. Saunders and Others No.], 1 11 was broad in the extreme: "[I]t is clear the term 'unused material' may apply to virtually all material collected during the investigation of a case." ' 112 Clearly, this inclusive interpretation could encompass any material that had, or might have, some bearing on the offense charged and the surrounding circumstances of the case. Even more far-reaching was the statement that the relevance of any unused material was to be decided not by the police or prosecution, but by the defense. The inevitable consequence was a fundamental reappraisal of the scope of the existing 104. (1982) 74 Crim. App. R. 302. 105. Although this term clearly included statements (including drafts) that did not form part of the committal bundles (statements and documentary exhibits used by the prosecution to determine whether to proceed with a case) served on the defense, the Guidelines were less helpful in identifying precisely which other categories of material might fall within the category and so qualify for disclosure.
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provisions. However, when the Attorney General declined to redraft the Guidelines, 113 the task of providing guidance for prosecutors and the police fell, instead, to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The result was the "Guinness Advice," issued in 1992, which instructed the police to catalog all materials generated during an investigation, while leaving decisions regarding disclosure to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 114 The police reaction was largely negative, partly due to the time expended meeting defense requests for material, but mainly because, in reality, control of what material was disclosed lay not with the police or CPS, but with the defense. Consequently, the defense routinely demanded copies of all unused material, relevant or not, thereby imposing enormous logistical pressures on the police in relation to the copying of documents, interview tapes, closed-circuit television, and other investigatory items.
115
The new regime was barely in place when the Court of Appeal delivered another blow to the Attorney General's Guidelines in upholding the appeal of Judith Ward in R v. Ward.
1 16 The court was severely critical of the prosecution's failure to disclose a mass of conflicting evidence that undermined the Crown's case and concluded: "[T]hose who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the Courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either led by them or made available to the defence." 1 17 What is more, in the 113. 202 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 39. (1997) (unpublished), a key aspect of which was the introduction of standard forms for use by the police as part of file preparation. The schedules MG6C (non-sensitive unused material) and MG6D (sensitive unused material) record all the unused material generated during the inquiry and are passed to the Crown Prosecution Service who would then provide the defense with copies of the MG6C. The defense was then entitled not only to inspect the non-sensitive listed documents, but also to have them copied at prosecution expense. As with later changes to the disclosure regime, the system was introduced with minimal training. In other words, the defense was to have access to all material collected by the prosecution, irrespective of its relevance to the case and any costs incurred by the prosecution in granting this access. At the same time as the courts grappled with the precise nature and extent of the duty of disclosure as defined in Ward, the subject was also under scrutiny from another quarter. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice had been appointed to consider the operation of the entire criminal justice system in the wake of a string of damaging miscarriages of justice, most of which involved defective disclosure by the prosecution. 120 For this reason, it was anticipated that the Commission would recommend even greater disclosure to the defense. The tone of the Commission's final report, 12 1 however, demonstrated far more sympathy with the police perspective on disclosure than with the defense: "IT]he defence can require the police and prosecution to comb through large masses of material in the hope either of causing delay or of chancing upon something that will induce the prosecution to drop the case rather than have to disclose the material concerned." ' 12 2 The import of this finding was clear. The Commission concluded that the purpose of defense requests for disclosure was not to secure relevant information, but to subvert the prosecution process-a position made all the more iniquitous by the absence of any comparable obligation on the defense to reveal information in its possession to the prosecution. 12 120. This inquiry was announced on the day that the appeals of the Birmingham Six, a case involving one of the worst miscarriages of justice in the history of the modern-day UK legal system, were allowed. The Birmingham Six were six men wrongfully convicted for two IRA pub bombings that killed twenty-one people. Sixteen years after their conviction, they were released from prison after evidence of police fabrication and suppression of evidence during their trial was unearthed. R v. 123. Nevertheless, the informal practice had evolved of the prosecution providing the defense the radical step of recommending a reciprocal, albeit more limited, duty on the part of the defense "to disclose the substance of their defence in advance of the trial." 124 The result was a fundamental shift of power back to the police and prosecution in determining what, if any, information should be revealed to the defense. 125 Unsurprisingly, this pronouncement was met with enthusiasm by a conservative government that was eager to demonstrate its commitment to a "law and order" agenda. When it came, the government's response went even further than the Commission's recommendations, particularly in relation to the proposals for a duty of defense disclosure. 126 The end product was the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.127
This was accompanied by the Association of Chief Police Offices and Crown Prosecution Service Joint Operational Instructions for the Disclosure of Unused Material
B. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 fundamentally changed the conduct of criminal cases. In particular, it introduced a three-stage disclosure procedure.
The new process replaced the previous system of largely automatic disclosure by the prosecution with a new system that recognized that the prosecution would routinely withhold certain material. Pursuant to the CPIA, the prosecution is required to disclose material to the defense only when the material in question first satisfies the test of "relevance" imposed by the Act:
[M]aterial may be relevant to the investigation if it appears to an investigator, or to the officer in charge of the investigation, or to the disclosure officer, that it has some bearing on any offence under investigation or any person being investigated, or to the surrounding with a letter outlining the issues that had influenced the prosecution's disclosure decisions and inviting the defense to comment and outline its position. 126. HOME OFFICE, DISCLOSURE: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, 1995, Cm. 2864. More fundamental, however, were concerns over the role of defense disclosure as a trigger for further disclosure by the prosecution which, it was feared, would restrict the scope of the defense case at trial as well as allow the prosecution to seek to justify withholding material on the grounds that its relevance was to a line of defense other than that contained in the defense statement. The Government openly acknowledged this point when seeking to restrict the common law duty of disclosure: "[t]he current law requires the prosecutor to disclose to the accused anything which might possibly be relevant to an issue at the trial, whether or not it has any bearing on the defence which the accused relies on at trial." 567 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1959) 463 (emphasis added).
127. The CPIA came into force on April 1, 1997.
circumstances of the case, unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case.
12 8
Under the CPIA, each investigation has a nominated "disclosure officer," who is responsible for satisfying the requirements of the Act relating to the collation and disclosure of unused material.
12 9 The most crucial aspect of this post is the officer's preparation of the schedules listing unused material that form the basis for all subsequent disclosure. 130 Although the wording of the Act suggests that the work of the disclosure officer bears a supervisory role with respect to the work of the officer in the case (OIC), in the overwhelming majority of cases, the same individual performs both roles. This is problematic for two reasons: first, it produces a potential conflict of interest for the officer concerned; second, an investigator who makes an error in assessing material for disclosure is hardly likely to correct that error by revisiting the decision as the disclosure officer. From the disclosure officer, the file is passed to the Crown Prosecution Service, and, ultimately, it falls to the CPS lawyer to fulfill the prosecution responsibilities set out under the Act.
Although the Act has undergone significant changes in the past year, 13 1 in its original form, the threefold disclosure procedure established by the CPIA begins with the primary disclosure stage, during which the prosecution must:
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which in the prosecutor's opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution against the accused, or (b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description mentioned in paragraph (a).
132
The term "material" covers anything:
128. Draft Codes of Practice § 2:1. The disclosure obligations under the CPIA apply once the accused is sent to Crown Court for trial on indictment, CPIA at § 1(2), and voluntarily appears before the magistrates' court. Notably, the individual prosecutor 134 must make a subjective assessment of the possible impact of the material on the prosecution's case based on the schedules prepared by the disclosure officer. 135 The non-sensitive schedule is then passed to the defense and, with it, the duty of disclosure.
Under the original 1996 Act, the defense is required to produce a detailed statement:
(a) setting out in general terms the nature of the accused's defence, (b) indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution, and (c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he takes issue with the prosecution.
136
The defense statement is to be served on the prosecution within fourteen days of primary disclosure 137 and prompts a reexamination of the unused material by the prosecution. This third step in the disclosure process is undertaken not by reference to the initial subjective test of primary disclosure, but, instead, by means of an objective assessment of the remaining unused material, 138 whereby the prosecutor must:
133. Id. at § 3(2). Subsequent case law has established that the words "in connection with the case for the prosecution against the accused" are to be broadly construed. (a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might be reasonably expected to assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement given under section 5 or 6, or (b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description mentioned in paragraph (a).
139
The purpose of requiring the prosecution to revisit its initial assessment of the unused material in the case is to provide additional protection for the accused without reverting to the previous regime under the Attorney General's Guidelines, which often required the police to provide copies of all material in their possession. The procedure under the CPIA, however, depends entirely on the defense statement to indicate the proposed character of the defense and identify material that may undermine the prosecution's case.
140
Despite the various amendments that have followed, the CPIA remains a procedure that leaves discretion in matters of disclosure to the prosecution, with only limited safeguards for the accused. Even the penalties for noncompliance or inadequate disclosure are unequal, as the 1996 Act provides no sanction for the prosecution beyond the granting of an order by the court compelling additional disclosure. 14 1 Furthermore, the procedure for obtaining additional prosecution material places the burden on the defense to show "reasonable cause to believe that there is prosecution material which might be reasonably expected to assist the defence," 14 2 thereby raising the question of to what extent the defense is equipped to identify such material when both the defense and the court may be ignorant of its existence. 1 43 139. CPIA § 7(2). 140. Id. at § 7(2)(a). The prosecutor is required only to disclose that "which might be reasonably expected to assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement." Id.
(emphasis added).
141. This is in contrast to the power to draw "adverse inference" following a defense failure to comply with the disclosure provisions. Id. at § 11.
142. Id. at § 8(2)(a). 143. As one observer states: Though the defence may apply to the court to order the disclosure of material held by the police, it first has to show how this helps its particular case. Without seeing it, the defence may not know how it is relevant and unless it can show its relevance will not be allowed to see it. Roger Ede, In the Name of Justice, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 1, 1997, at 33. So-called "fishing expeditions" were again discouraged in R v. Brown (Winston), [1995] [Vol. 38
C. CPIA Disclosure
Since its inception, the 1996 Act has accumulated a somewhat troubled history 144 and attracted widespread concern. After eight years of CPIA disclosure, it is clear that the statutory disclosure regime is not working. All of the extant research 145 has highlighted numerous structural failings in the operation of disclosure that continues to produce miscarriages of justice. For example, a government study of disclosure revealed that "the CP[I]A is not at present working as Parliament intended; nor does its present operation command the confidence of criminal practitioners .... [I]n a significant proportion of contested cases CPS compliance with CPIA procedures is defective in one or more respects." 146 These disclosure deficiencies have raised doubts among criminal practitioners about the quality of disclosure 14 7 and "have led to a lack of trust in the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the schedules of non-sensitive and sensitive material provided by the 144. From the outset, there were concerns over the provisions as they progressed through Parliament. As an example, the Bill arrived for consideration with 102 government amendments having been tabled in a single day, leading to much criticism: "In some 25 years of parliamentary life I can remember no occasion on which a Bill that was not urgent has come forward so ill prepared and so carelessly drafted . . . The truth is that the Bill has been rushed forward in a most extraordinary way." 567 PARL. Criminal practitioners outside the prosecution ... expressed almost universal lack of faith that the system is working satisfactorily. There were doubts about the consistent quality of investigations and the capturing, recording or following up of relevant matters. There were doubts about the quality of consultation and communication between the officer in charge of the investigation and others involved in a particular investigation There were doubts about the priority given to the task by the nominated disclosure officer and about the suitability of some disclosure officers. Id. In addition, in a survey of criminal barristers in the UK conducted by the Criminal Bar Association, 83% of respondents felt that police schedules of unused material were likely to be unreliable, 90% felt that there was no reliable method of independent scrutiny of the disclosure procedures and 84% concluded that CPIA as a whole was, "either not working well or working badly." British Academy of Forensic Sciences and the Criminal Bar Association (1999) Survey of the Practising Independent Bar into the Operation in Practice of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Disclosure Provisions. Another study commissioned by the Home Office found that, of those surveyed, nearly 60% of barristers, 72% of defense barristers, 50% of defense solicitors, and 15% of judges believed that non-sensitive unused material that should have been disclosed to the defense was frequently not so disclosed. PLOTNIKOFF & WOOLFSON, supra note 145, at 71. [Vol. 38 disclosure officer to the prosecutor."' 14 8 The study also noted concerns about the overall ability of investigating and disclosure officers to perform their duties under the CPIA. 1 49 The continuing failings of CPIA disclosure are dramatically illustrated by the "London City Bond" cases, which developed from a protracted investigation by HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) into the evasion of excise duty by customers of the London City Bond Warehouse in the late 1990s. The fraud related to alcohol, which could be bought and sold between dealers within the network of bonded warehouses without incurring any tax. The tax became payable once the alcohol was released for sale into the domestic market; therefore, if the goods were simply bound for another bonded warehouse then no tax was paid. By falsifying documentation that suggested that the goods were being transferred from one bonded warehouse to another, it was possible for fraudsters to remove the alcohol from the warehouse without paying tax in order to sell it on the open market at an enormous profit. Due to the controls in place within the bonded warehouse system, such frauds are difficult to conceal from the warehouse management and this led to senior staff within the London City Bond Warehouse notifying HMCE officials of the existence of large scale fraud on the part of some of their customers. Rather than arrest the rogue traders immediately, HMCE investigators elected to allow the crimes to continue in order to increase the sums involved and so be seen to solve a larger fraud. This was achieved with the assistance of informants who worked at the warehouse. However, because of the active encouragement of the offences by investigators, the existence of the informants was not disclosed to the defense. 150 More egregiously, this information was concealed not only from the defense but also from the court, 15 1 thus fatally undermining the convictions attained by the 151. Id. Although the role of informants is routinely concealed from the defense under the doctrine of 'public interest immunity' (PH), it is an essential aspect of the process that the court is fully apprised of any such sensitive material in order to determine whether it should be disclosed. additional consideration is that the UK is subject to Article 6.3 of the European Convention on prosecution. The end result was a series of prosecutions that were, by any objective standard, disastrous, with the collapse of thirteen separate trials involving a total of 109 defendants and an estimated total fraud of £668 million. 15 2 By the conclusion of the proceedings, all appeals against conviction (even those following a guilty plea) had been successful. 153 In addition, following lengthy abuse of process hearings, the prosecution offered no evidence against the forty defendants who were yet to stand trial or in respect of whom retrials had previously been ordered. 154 The conclusions of the subsequent government inquiry are indicative of the tenor of the criticism directed at the disclosure debacle:
[C]ourts were misled . . . Judges were not told by counsel, who themselves had been misled, that there were other undocumented contacts with the informant. If the nature and extent of the missing contacts had been known to counsel and disclosed to the judges concerned it is at least possible and in some cases likely that a Such cases have done little to dispel the prevalent belief that the CPIA provisions are commonly misapplied and misunderstood, and confidence in the disclosure regime remains fragile. Three years after the CPIA was implemented, fresh Attorney General's Guidelines were issued in an attempt to clarify the obligations of both police and prosecutors, and to address the inconsistent practices of both police and prosecutors across the United Kingdom. 157 However, it became clear that more fundamental changes were required and so, in April 2005, sections of the Criminal Justice Act 2003158 came into force, making two important and related amendments to the 1996 statute. First, at the primary disclosure stage, the phrase, "in the prosecutor's opinion might undermine" is replaced by, "might reasonably be considered capable of undermining." 159 Second, the 2003 Act creates a continuing duty to disclose on the part of the prosecutor. 160 The combined effect of these provisions is not only to remove the subjective test for disclosure that previously existed in relation to initial disclosure, but also to abolish the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" disclosure, creating instead a single ongoing duty on the part of the prosecution. Crucially, however, the primary responsibility for ensuring that all relevant exculpatory material is disclosed to the defense remains with the disclosure officer who continues to work with a minimum of training and supervision. [Vol. 38
III. UK LESSONS FOR ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE
A. Lessons Learned
An examination of the UK disclosure experience reveals many potential learning points for Illinois and other states that wish to address problems surrounding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. A sideby-side inspection shows obvious similarities-both Illinois and the United Kingdom require the disclosure of exculpatory and mitigating evidence to the accused as part and parcel to an adversarial criminal justice system, 16 2 but neither has been particularly successful at enforcing this mandate. In addition, both have adopted reforms in the aftermath of highly publicized governmental failures to hew to the duty to disclose. Whereas Illinois has sought to shore up deficiencies in the practice of disclosure by reasserting and reaffirming the prosecutor's duty to disclose throughout its procedural and professional rules, the United Kingdom has attempted to strengthen its commitment to disclosure by adopting a detailed system of discovery designed to guide both police and prosecutors through the process and to ensure the disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal case. Although the reforms initiated are not identical, the differences are more in degree than in kind. The revisions and amendments to both discovery processes serve the same goals-to remind of (or reiterate) and further define the existing disclosure duty.
A bird's-eye view of the two systems offers even more compelling points of comparison. Over the past thirty years, the United Kingdom has operated under three distinct systems regulating the disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the accused: the common law system as applied by the courts, the quasi-statutory system created by the Attorney General's Guidelines, and the current statutory system of the CPIA. 16 3 The shifting sands of the UK approach reflect dissatisfaction with the various methods of enforcing the disclosure obligation. When disclosure violations erupted in a series of injustices, the informal common law discovery structure gave way to increased regulation under the Attorney General's Guidelines. 164 As disclosure continued to present an intractable problem, the Guidelines, in turn, yielded to the 162. This is in contrast to the judge-controlled system of countries, like France, that employ an inquisitorial system of justice. enactment of the CPIA. 165 All three systems evolved to give meaning to the accused's fundamental right to disclosure in advance of trial, yet all have foundered. 166 In Illinois, prosecutors safeguard the right of an accused to disclosure of exculpatory evidence pursuant to the Brady doctrine, as developed by the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts, along with professional rules of conduct established by the Illinois Supreme Court. 167 The shocking exposure of disclosure failures accompanying the current crisis in the administration of the death penalty compelled Illinois to reconsider its approach to enforcing the Brady rule. Faced with increasing public pressure to ensure prosecutorial observance of the constitutional duty, the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced mandatory language in its professional rules, and the Illinois legislature codified specific disclosure duties in capital cases. 16 From an evolutionary standpoint, Illinois appears to be on the brink of, or perhaps is in the early stages of, a fundamental change in its method of enforcing the duty to disclose-contemplating a move from an era dominated by court doctrine and professional rules toward a system of statutory enforcement. This alteration in approach parallels earlier transformations in the United Kingdom. Certainly, if the Illinois legislature were to give effect to the comprehensive array of recommendations made by the Capital Punishment Commission, the similarities between the Illinois and UK disclosure structures would continue to grow in number as well as in kind. Considering that several of the proposals bear a marked resemblance to disclosure duties described in the CPIA, 170 169. Zimring, supra note 16, at 119 (noting that "most of the big-ticket items are still being debated in the Illinois legislature").
170. For example, the Ryan Commission's recommendation of statutory duties for the police to pursue all reasonable investigative leads matches CPIA provisions mandating that police take "all reasonable steps.., for the purposes of the investigation," CPIA, 1996, ch. 25 § 23(l)(a), and the Draft Codes' requirement that investigators "pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect," Draft Codes of Practice, § 3.4. The Commission also suggested that a disclosure officer be appointed for every criminal case and that the police be required to create schedules documenting evidence and share these schedules with the prosecution. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 38 a shift in the direction of the statutory regime currently in force in the United Kingdom.
Given that Illinois is considering a path already well worn by the United Kingdom, the UK disclosure experience is useful for evaluating not only the latest changes to Illinois law but also the more aggressive proposals that have yet to be adopted by the Illinois legislature. Every criminal justice system faces an unpalatable decision in deciding how rigorous to make the disclosure regime. Recent history in the United Kingdom has shown that a wide-ranging disclosure obligation advances the prosecutorial duty, but exacerbates investigations and creates expense and delay.
17 1 Too narrow a disclosure duty reduces costs and burdens for investigators and the prosecution, but risks further miscarriages of justice. 17 2 In seeking to strike that elusive balance between public pressure for a more robust criminal justice system and the right of the accused to the disclosure by the government of exculpatory or mitigating evidence, the United Kingdom tested three distinct models of disclosure, but all three systems failed to remedy the problems.
Why did these systems fail? The answer cannot be found in the wording of the common law, Attorney General's Guidelines, or the provisions of the CPIA. Instead, the answer is evident in the attitudes and working practices of those charged with their implementation. The UK experience has shown that subjecting investigators to a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence creates, for many of them, an unenviable conflict of interest. Tests for material to be disclosed are routinely ignored and items are omitted from unused material schedules when officers consider them to be either irrelevant or problematic. 173 The basis of most, if not all, of these problems is the desire of the investigator to secure a conviction, based on his or her personal belief in the guilt of the suspect. 174 The approach adopted by the OIC toward the 174. This concept of the officer's certainty of guilt is a well-documented aspect of many previous studies of operational police work. "Officers suppose that they have access to privileged knowledge because they 'know' that the suspect is guilty and therefore accept some responsibility for seeing that justice is done, even if that means helping the evidence along a little.'" SIMON HOLDAWAY, INSIDE THE BRITISH POLICE 112 (1983). This paternalistic approach to the criminal justice system is frequently expressed by police officers and lies at the root of much so-called "noble cause corruption." As articulated by one Chief Inspector, "[t]he feeling is that the rules of evidence are weighted [against the prosecution] and need help. There's the honest belief that the fellow is guilty and the law needs a bit of help to ensure the right result is achieved." JAMES MORTON, BENT COPPERS 275 (1993) . "The adversary system itself molds a context for the [Vol. 38 investigation, together with the discretion exercised at all stages of the inquiry, allows the final case file to be shaped in a way that limits the potential challenges posed by any unused material so as to emphasize those aspects of the case most favorable to the prosecution. 175 The 1996 Act, in particular, creates a fundamental conflict for the police because, while officers are required to conduct their investigations with all diligence, they must also actively seek out and disclose information that assists the defense. Inevitably, many officers regard this as undermining their work by reducing the chances of achieving what they see as their primary objective of securing a conviction, 176 leading to the common perception that, by providing adequate disclosure, the police are "doing the defense's job for them." The CPIA is predicated on the modem role of the police officer, as a gatherer of evidence rather than an agent of the prosecution, 17 7 but this role does not come naturally to many officers and creates undeniable tensions. 17 8 Thus, although the impact of the latest amendments to CPIA disclosure has yet to be felt, there is little expectation that merely modifying the wording of the provisions will fundamentally alter the approach of investigators towards their disclosure obligations.
These observations apply equally to the current situation in Illinois. In Illinois, as well as generally throughout the United States, the responsibility for serious cases of non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence has rested with prosecutors 17 9 more so than on the police or other investigative personnel, which has been the case in the United Kingdom, 18 0 but the disclosure violations and their underlying reasons are much the same in both countries. The trouble with disclosure appears to arise from the ineffectiveness of a system dependent on the discretion of individual prosecutors and officers and the adversarial context within which they carry out their disclosure duties. 18 1 Mere amplification of the duty to disclose is insufficient to dislodge "deeply ingrained norms about the proper role of the prosecutor as zealous advocate." ' 1 82 Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Bagley, aptly described the problem:
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves into the duty of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must play poses a serious obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor is by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. He is a trained attorney who must aggressively seek convictions in court on behalf of a victimized public. At the same time, as a representative of the state, he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination of truth. Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to identify the material that could undermine his case. Given this obviously unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advocates oftentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence, often in cases in which there is no doubt that the failure to disclose was a result of absolute good faith.
18 3
Moreover, the high degree of discretion granted prosecutors under the Bagley materiality standard, together with the remote prospect of reversal 184 and the unlikely event of professional sanctions, 185 provides little assurance that all prosecutors "will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." 18 6 Academics have been making these points for years, 187 yet little movement has been made toward true reform. Perhaps, the concrete example set by the UK experience will assist United States policymakers in putting hypothesis into practice.
Although the Illinois reforms and proposals for reform are wellintended, it is questionable as to whether they will actually reduce the number of cases in which compliance fails to occur. None of the recent additions are novel; all are based on long-standing constitutional and ethical duties. 18 8 But even the innovative and more extensive disclosure [Vol. 38 courts and attorney disciplinary bodies start punishing Brady violations more severely. 193 Ellen Yaroshefsky proposes that independent state and federal commissions be created to examine wrongful conviction cases and enforce disciplinary rules for prosecutors. 194 Other commentators urge states to better protect the due process right. For example, Joseph Weeks suggests that states impose more substantial disclosure obligations under their state constitutions. 195 Janet Hoeffel argues that courts could "create better legal standards for the due process violation than those set as the floor in Bagley."' 196 Similar solutions have been offered in Illinois. In a statement made before the Illinois House Prosecutorial Misconduct Committee, Professor Lawrence Marshall suggested that the state "put some real bite into the disciplinary system" by creating a special regulatory body to investigate and prosecute prosecutors. 197 As described by Professor Marshall, "Judges should be required to refer all cases on which they find misconduct to this body, and this body should be charged with the duty of ensuring that only individuals with unblemished records should be trusted with the title prosecutor."' 19 8 He also requested that the Committee consider reducing the absolute immunity provided to prosecutors to qualified immunity, which would expose prosecutors who intentionally violate disclosure rules to civil suits. 199 Finally, Professor Marshall appealed to legislators to statutorily augment the standard set in Bagley. 20 0 This particular recommendation found new life in a House bill requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. 20 1 The drafted statute set forth a remedy for Brady violations: new trials for defendants if prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence absent clear and convincing evidence that the misconduct did not affect the trial outcomes. 2°2 Although the bill died in committee, 20 3 the good intentions that fueled it need not. Unless officers are held accountable for defective disclosure decisions by means of sanctions or by reversing convictions that spring from disclosure violations, there is little likelihood that they will adopt a more thorough approach to their disclosure obligations.
CONCLUSION
Illinois has drawn national attention in its attempts to redress a spate of wrongful convictions uncovered in recent years. As the number of death row exonerations continues to climb, the need for reform increases. This article is an important first step toward the development of a workable model of disclosure for the State of Illinois. Illinois prosecutors bear evidentiary disclosure responsibilities under the United States Constitution and state rules, but revelations of errors in capital cases demonstrate that these protections can fail, with potentially lethal consequences. Similar failures in the United Kingdom have triggered a mixture of judicial, executive, and legislative response, but the UK experience has shown that mere fortification of disclosure responsibilities is insufficient to curb violations. Reinforcement via reminders will not work to contain the adversarial and crime control culture of the prosecutor's office, but reinforcement via enforcement will. Accordingly, frank discussion among policymakers about a system of accountability for prosecutors is pivotal to stemming the injustices that flow from Brady violations.
American disclosure practice is built on trust-trust in prosecutors as representatives of our government to choose public justice over personal victory;204 trust that, although prosecutors may strike hard blows, they will not strike foul ones. 20 
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But the mounting numbers of highly publicized wrongful convictions have shaken society's confidence in
